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Abstract: As is well known, identity studies have always to do with drawing
boundaries. In Western sinological works as in the debates of Chinese intellec-
tuals concerning their cultural identity, there are a number of fields which are
again and again demarcated against some corresponding fields in other cul-
tures: Chinese philosophy, Chinese literature, Chinese history etc. The practice
of drawing boundaries is not limited to the work of the so called cultural
relativists. Universalists, who display a critical attitude towards cultural relati-
vism and advocate the equality of cultural phenomena in the world as a matter
of principle, construct their argumentation also on the basis of a crucial bound-
ary, i. e. the conception of their own program – their own academic identity – as
opposing the program of cultural relativism. The present study defends the idea
that any discussion of questions concerning identity constructions, any act of
drawing boundaries, as any criticism against drawing them can be interpreted as
a political statement and that they become every time problematic when they are
accompanied by an explicit negation of politics or when they are not reflected
upon as participating in politics. The focus will lie on Chinese readings of
Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) and on current Chinese debates about the
issue of national identity.
Keywords: Chinese intellectual history, Xinzixue – new thought-masters studies,
Sinologism, Orientalism, Chinese Identity
它山之石， 可以為錯。
《詩經·小雅·鶴鳴》
1 Introduction
As is well known, identity studies have always to do with drawing boundaries.
In Western sinological works as in the debates of Chinese intellectuals concern-
ing their cultural identity, there are a number of fields which are again and
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again demarcated against some corresponding fields in other cultures: Chinese
philosophy, Chinese literature, Chinese history etc. The practice of drawing
boundaries is not limited to the work of the so called cultural relativists.
Universalists, who display a critical attitude towards cultural relativism and
advocate the equality of cultural phenomena in the world as a matter of
principle, construct their argumentation also on the basis of a crucial boundary,
i. e. the conception of their own program – their own academic identity – as
opposing the program of cultural relativism.
The present study defends the idea that any discussion of questions con-
cerning identity constructions, any act of drawing boundaries, as any criticism
against drawing them can be interpreted as a political statement and that they
become every time problematic when they are accompanied by an explicit
negation of politics or when they are not reflected upon as participating in
politics.1 The focus will lie on Chinese readings of Edward Said’s Orientalism
(1978) and on current Chinese debates about the issue of national identity.
However, the problem is not restricted to Chinese intellectuals alone as the
following two examples may illustrate.
In his Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic
Discourse (2008), John Makeham addresses the issue of the ruxue-fever of the
late twentieth century and still at its peak when he was writing this book, and
discusses its role in the process of identity building of contemporary Chinese
intellectuals. One of his main statements is that this issue pertains exclusively to
the frame of cultural nationalism rather than state nationalism. The promotion
of ruxue-studies is said not to have been orchestrated by the party-state2 and the
so called cultural nationalism which focuses upon a moral regeneration of the
people and is independent of political nationalism3 has remained purely a
concern of the Chinese academy. “Most fundamentally, however, ruxue-centered
Chinese cultural nationalism is a movement directed at promoting the belief that
it is ruxue-as-culture that constitutes the uniqueness and value of the Chinese
1 The present study does not pursue the idea that any academic study on China is necessarily a
political statement. However, politics, as far as it reflects the issue of mutual representations of
East and West, the attitude towards cultural differences, either a negative one, characteristic of
universalists, or an affirmative one, – remains a significant ideal background in the global
production of knowledge on the East. Consequently, the main purpose of the present study is
not reproaching Sinologists for participating in politics, but rather a critical reflection of a wide-
spread phenomenon when politics is treated as a troublesome issue in questions concerning
national identities.
2 Makeham 2008: 7.
3 Makeham 2008: 14. For a contrary view on the high relevance of the ruxue-fever for the
Communist Party, see Meissner 2006; as well as Lee 1998.
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nation.”4 The axiomatic separation of culture and state as well as the exclusion
of the Chinese academy from politics seems to be rather problematic. In the light
of this exclusion, the words “Academic Discourse” in the title of the book cannot
be understood in the sense of Foucault: the academia is put outside of power
relations and this is a – even if not really plausible – statement with political
implications.
Carine Defoort’s “Fu Sinian’s View on Philosophy, Ancient Chinese Masters,
and Chinese Philosophy” may serve as a further example. The article discusses
the reluctance of Fu Sinian (1896–1950) – one of the key figures in the May
Fourth movement – to apply the concept of philosophy on the traditional
Chinese thought. Defoort states a contradiction between Fu’s striving for objec-
tivity and his evaluative emotional attitude towards Western concepts and
Chinese tradition. She finds it striking that Fu’s descriptions go along with
evaluations, which probably [sic] may have resulted from the critical situation
of his nation.5 The inconsistencies of Fu Sinian’s scholarly method are explained
in the following manner: “Fu Sinian, who came from Shandong, had a strong
sense of the Japanese threat, which became ever more pressing while he was
writing his book. As many scholars have pointed out, under such conditions, it
was hardly possible to separate academic research from political concerns and
nationalistic sentiments.”6 This passage suggests that in principle it is quite
possible to separate academic research and political concerns in questions on
national identity. Defoort does not provide any arguments in support of this
suggestion, nor does she pay attention to the fact that the subject of the analysis
in her own article – the applicability of the concept of philosophy to Chinese
tradition – is by no means an unpolitical issue and has been part of a discourse
in which Chinese and Western intellectuals have been involved since the end of
the Qing dynasty and which has been dominated by the perception of un/equal
global power relations and questions concerning the nature of ties between
knowledge and power.
4 Makeham 2008: 338. Makeham owes his distinction of cultural and political nationalisms to
John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of
the Irish Nation State (1987). It is worth mentioning that for Hutchinson both varieties of
nationalism are directly involved in politics. Broaching the issue of cultural nationalism in
Ireland, he discusses at large the political engagement of Irish intelligentsia, who, among other
things, could “claim the mantle of a victorious war of independence against the British state.”
(Hutchinson, 1987: 306).
5 Defoort 2012: 278.
6 Defoort 2012: 298.
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It is well known that the relations between academic research and political
concerns are also the central subject in Edward Said’s Orientalism, a classic of
post-colonial studies. Said exposes deformations of knowledge about the
Oriental other by Occidental academia as an instrument of colonization. He
formulates the aim of his study as a warning against “too close a relationship
between the scholar and the state”.7 In other words, he calls intellectuals to
distance themselves from politics that produce deformed perceptions of the
other as a means of colonization. He does not provide any definite answer to
the question whether it is possible for human sciences to abandon political
concerns altogether. Although he displays a tendency to plead for such an
abandonment, which might be regarded as an idealistic attitude, he never-
theless demonstrates in a quite persuasive manner, how necessary it is for any
scholar involved in issues of cross-cultural identities and cross-cultural knowl-
edge production to critically reflect upon his/her own possible relationship
to politics, to become aware of the dangers pertaining to cultural
unconsciousness.
Since the early nineties, Said’s Orientalism has remained a most important
point of orientation in the discussions of Chinese intellectuals on their national
cultural identity in the global context. It is a big paradox that many of the
studies, which rely heavily on Said and take the issue with representations of
the other as a matter of politics, are also very critical of Said. One characteristic
feature of these criticisms is that, turning against various epistemic distortions
produced by Western scholars about China, they simultaneously try to neu-
tralize the political side of their own position, to overcome politics, to make it
non-present. Such attempts are either implicit (as in the case of Wang
Mingming’s The West as the Other: A Genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism,
2014) or explicit (as in Gu Mingdong’s various critical studies on Sinologism.)
The present study means to call into question the advisability of these
attempts. It concludes with a discussion of China’s New School of Thought-
Masters (xinzixue新子學), one of the most prominent current movements in the
Chinese academia. If Gu Mingdong, who stresses the necessity for scholars to
reject political concerns, takes his monograph on Sinologism to be an alter-
native to Orientalism and post-colonial studies, the present study raises the
question, if the proponents of the xinzixue, who rather suggest the impossi-
bility of such a rejection, are on their part not to be understood as a more
plausible alternative to Sinologism.
7 Said 2003 [1978]: 326.
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2 Part I: From orientalism to occidentalism
Among the first studies which documented an active reception of Said’s
Orientalism in China was the publication of a round-table discussion of it in
Dushu 读书 (No. 9) in 1993, six years before the book was translated into
Chinese.8 From the Dushu discussion, a special attention among Chinese scholars
received the article by Zhang Kuan 张宽 “Ou Mei ren yan zhong de ‘fei wo zulei’
欧美人眼中的“非我族类” (“The ‚Other̒ in the Eyes of Europeans and Americans“.)
According to him, it was a serious drawback of Said not to have reflected upon
Chinese materials in his critique of Orientalism.9 From the very beginning, the
occupation of Western intellectuals with China was imbued with ideology: idea-
listic representations of China in the age of enlightenment were succeeded by
pejorative ones – China as a sleeping monster (chenshui de guaiwu 沉睡的怪物),
as unable to innovate (wu gexin nengli无革新能力10), etc. – at the end of the Qing
dynasty. In Zhang’s opinion, Chinese intellectuals of the twentieth century had
also contributed to the construction of Orientalism in a significant way, as far as
they oriented themselves towards Western norms, and under the influence of the
West began to perceive themselves as xenophobic (pai wai 排外), egoistic (zisi 自
私), illogical (bu luoji 不逻辑), and unhygienic (bu weisheng 不卫生.11)
It deserves attention that already in this relatively early Chinese study on
Said Orientalism is discussed alongside with a counter-discourse which Zhang
calls Xifang zhuyi 西方主义 (Occidentalism.) By this term Zhang means a system
of erroneous and distorting representations of the West, which was motivated by
an impulsive (fuzao 浮躁), blind (mangmu 盲目), irrational (feilixing 非理性)
attitude of Chinese intellectuals to the West since the early twentieth century.
The Occidentalism manifested itself in many forms, from a self-identification
with Western norms up to a total rejection of the West. As a discourse,
Occidentalism is seen as a counterpart of Orientalism. Both are perceived as
dangerous, if not critically reflected. Zhang’s article is concluded by an appeal to
the watchfulness of Chinese intellectuals in questions regarding the politiciza-
tion of mutual representations by East and West.12
8 The work was first translated into Chinese in 1999 in Hong Kong as Dongfangxue 東方學 by
Wang Yugen 王宇根 (Hong Kong, Sanlian shudian) and in Taiwan, in the same year, as
Dongfang zhuyi 東方主義 – by Wang Zhihong 王志弘 (et al., Taipei, Lixu chubanshe.)
9 Zhang 1993: 5.
10 Zhang 1993: 6.
11 Zhang 1993: 7.
12 Two years later, he wrote a further polemic critical essay on Orientalism trying to liberate the
Chinese academy of the hegemonic colonizing Western discourse (xifang quanshi huayu, zhimin
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Two years after the publication of Zhang Kuan’s article, Chen Xiaomei
issued a monograph on politically instrumentalized representations of the
West by China: Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China
(1995). She distinguishes between an official Occidentalism under Mao, among
other things the three world theory, by which the party tried to discipline the
population of China in accord with Maoist ideology, and an unofficial one. The
unofficial Occidentalism is said to distance itself from the current ideology. By
means of a number of highly critical representations of traditional Chinese
identity symbols (as the Great Wall, the Yellow river etc. in the film He shang
河殇 in 1988) against the background of Western civilization, the unofficial
Occidentalism was a way to express political opposition and to challenge the
party state. Chen Xiaomei draws a parallel between this unofficial Occidentalism
of the Post-Mao era and the one of the May Fourth period and stresses the
ambivalent character of the latter:
When the West is used... as a strong anti-official statement against Confucian traditional
culture, this Occidentalist discourse can be regarded as politically liberating. On the other
hand, however, in view of the particular historical conditions of the May Fourth period,
which is characterized by its embrace of an anti-imperialistic agenda as its top priority, the
appeal to the West paradoxically turned out to be a yet another way in which Western
fathers subjugated and colonized “Third World” women... 13
Chen Xiaomei regards the liberation of women from the yoke of Confucian
traditional norms as an idea pertaining to a “male-dominated-feminist” dis-
course, in which the voices of real women were hardly present. She discusses
this gender issue at large in the concluding chapter of the monograph, in order
to demonstrate “the continuity and complexity of Occidentalism in modern
Chinese society”.14
The observation of continuities between the Occidentalism of the May
Fourth era and that of the end of the twentieth century appears to be a some-
what contradictory statement, especially when it is read in the context of Chen’s
huayu 西方权势话语，殖民话语.) (Zhang 1995: 37). For an early detailed critical discussion of
Zhang Kuan’s attitude towards Said, see Zhang Longxi 1998: 190–193. Zhang Kuan’s dismissal
of ideas and theories which were created in the last hundred years is designated as “incredibly
arrogant and astonishingly self-righteous” (Zhang 1998: 192.) Zhang Longxi’s monograph
deserves attention also as reflecting the first wave of Said’s impact on Chinese intellectuals
and interpreting it in terms of politics, of the “rekindled sentiments of nationalism” (Zhang
1998: 190.) This critical attitude to the nationalism pertaining to Chinese critiques of Orientalism
is shared by Tao Dongfeng (2010), who is discussed below.
13 Chen 1995: 25.
14 Chen 1995: 25.
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constant references to Foucault and the discussion of the Occidentalism dis-
course as being tied to power relations.15 As the power relations in the post-
colonial era are diametrically different from those of the early twentieth century,
it would make more sense to speak about two different discourses with respec-
tively different ties between knowledge and power: if for the May Fourth the
attempts of self-strengthening and Westernization were to a large extent accom-
panied by the perception of the West as a real or potential threat, in the post-
colonial discourse the West appears as a provider of theories, in which its own
hegemonic scholarly practice of the past is being exposed and the other – the
epistemically decolonized – becomes the subject of a fair democratic treatment.
Another recent monograph on Occidentalism by Wang Mingming: The West
as the Other: A Genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism (2014) may serve as an
illustration of the diversity of discourses, between which Chen Xiaomei observes
continuities. It sets out with the following criticism of Said:
As a canonical work for post-colonial studies, it [Said’s Orientalism-V.V.] ironically carries
on the same modern Western thought it critiques. While Said is critical of the expansive
power of modern Western knowledge, his work paradoxically functions as if a spirit
possesses us and presses us to treat the West as the only imaginative and perceptive
subject.16
Wang’s genealogy of Chinese images of the West extends from the Zhou dynasty
up to the May Fourth era. The last is seen as taking leave of the traditional
associations of the West with India and the Kunlun-mountain. The newly
created modern vision of the West is that of Europe and America, which appear
as new sources of truth, as a promised land of Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy.
Similarly to Chen Xiaomei, Wang pays attention to the ambivalent character of
this new ideal-image:
Yet the West now also became the source of imperialism. To “fetch the scriptures” from it
was thus not to be seen as putting the East into the “Western world.” On the contrary, they
were seen as applicable and valuable only when they served to make China an integrated
“isolate”, separated from the “world system” of imperialism. Only in this way could such
scriptures be of any use.17
It is striking that Wang, who bases his genealogy methodologically on post-
colonial studies and is largely inspired by Foucault and Said, dedicates only
some scarce passing remarks to them and does not discuss the current power
15 Chen 1995: 25.
16 Wang 2014: 9.
17 Wang 2014: 238.
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relations or the current discourse from which his monograph has arisen. The
decisive image of the West as the source of post-colonial theories is not part of
his genealogy and the above criticism of Said belongs to the very few statements
he makes on this subject. He does not mention that discussions on Chinese
imagination in comparison with the imagination of the West are by no means
a new theme in the dialogue between China and the West. For example, this
topic was of great interest for Lu Xun 魯迅 (1881–1936) in Zhongguo xiaoshuo
shilüe中國小說史略 (1925.) Wang Mingming draws on some of the same sources
as Lu Xun (Mu tianzi zhuan 穆天子傳, Shan hai jing 山海經) and, again, like Lu
Xun he is engaged in comparing these texts with Greek sources. The difference
of discourses may be demonstrated by the fact that Wang’s judgment on the
materials under study is diametrically opposed to that of Lu Xun: while Lu Xun
complained about the scarcity of transmitted pieces of Chinese myths and
related it to an underdeveloped imagination of Chinese in comparison with
their Greek counterparts,18 Wang Mingming observes “a more sophisticated
reflection on the self-other relationships in ‘civilization’”19 characteristic of
Chinese imagination in contrast to Greek texts. Ignoring this historical parallel
between his own and Lu Xun’s judgments can be interpreted as a sign of
insufficient political self-awareness or as an attempt to transcend politics. In
either case, politics remains a big – if even carefully concealed – issue for his
analysis, which is reflected both in his confronting Chinese and Western cul-
tures in qualitative terms and in his criticism of Said’s theory.20
Political implications of Chinese critiques against Said were subject of Tao
Dongfeng’s陶东风 essay “Jingti Zhongguo wenxue yanjiu zhong de minzu zhuyi
qingxiang” 警惕中国文学研究中的民族主义倾向 (“Warning against nationalis-
tic trends in Chinese literary studies.”) In his opinion, Zhang Kuan and other
critics of Said use Said’s theory only as a weapon (wuqi 武器21), their real aim
being not a correction of Said or other post-colonial theorists, but the negation
of the May Fourth. Tao interprets it in terms of a current Chinese cultural crisis,
which is due not to a rupture with some ancient tradition but to the one with Lu
Xun.22 By these words he addresses the humanist enlightening spirit Lu Xun’s
and his attempts to correct what he himself considered to be lacking in his own
culture in order to decrease the confrontation of East and West. The same may
be observed about Edward Said, who, being a Western scholar, pursued a
18 Lu 1982: 21–22.
19 Wang 2014: 111.
20 For a more detailed discussion of Wang Mingming’s book, see Vetrov 2014.
21 Tao 2010: 46.
22 Tao 2010: 48.
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similar aim of correcting deep flaws of the Western production of knowledge
about the Orient. Ironically, Chinese theories of Occidentalism which all depart
from Said’s book did not reduce the confrontation between East and West, but
contributed much to enhancing it in a substantial degree. The highest polemic
point was reached by the critics of the so called Sinologism, who therefore
deserve a separate discussion.
3 Part II. Sinologism: A farewell to politics
Similarly as in the case with Orientalism, the concept of Sinologism originated
from the West and initially aimed at a critical reevaluation of Western knowl-
edge production about China in a Western dominated discourse. Bob Hodge und
Kam Louie, who were the first proponents of the critique of Sinologism, expli-
citly refer to Foucault and Said as a theoretical basement for their monograph
The Politics of Chinese Language and Culture: The Art of Reading Dragons (1998.)
For example, the use of the concept discourse in the sense of Foucault is
explained as follows:
Discourse in Foucault’s sense operates as part of a mechanism for social control in other
spheres of public life. Sinology in the West is a classic instance of a discursive regime in
this sense, in its role as a site for controlling who can speak with authority about China,
what can be known and what is constituted, by the rule of this discursive formation, as
forever unknowable, unspeakable, about China. In fact it is illuminating to use Foucault’s
ideas in this area also, to look at the processes that have constructed China in and for the
West.23
The authors limit the active role in the production of Sinologism to Western
scholars. Thus, China as it is reflected in the Western academic discipline of
Sinology is seen only as an object of epistemic constructions in a field where the
West displays its undisputed hegemonic role. The study is openly conceived as a
political critique, for which Foucault and Said provide an illuminating theore-
tical background. Unfortunately, this monograph remained rather a relatively
short introduction into Sinologism than a systematic analytical critique of it.
Among the most crucial questions which remained open was the participation of
Chinese intellectuals in the production of Sinology as well as the corresponding
mechanisms of cooperation between East and West. Nevertheless, the book
received lots of attention in academic circles and initiated heated discussions
of Chinese intellectuals on the politics within Sinology.
23 Hodge/Louie 1998: 12.
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The first Chinese study dedicated to Sinologism was the essay by Zhou Ning
周宁 “Hanxue huo “Hanxue zhuyi”” 汉学或“汉学主义” (““Sinology or
“Sinologism””, 2004.) His aim was to warn the academy against dangers of
unconscious Sinologism (wu yishi zhong de “hanxue zhuyi” 无意识中的“汉学主
义”24), of scholarly colonization (xueshu zhimin(zhuyi) 学术殖民(主义)25) as well
as of a conspiracy of knowledge and power (zhishi yu quanli de “hemou”知识与权
力的“合谋”.26) Zhou Ning follows Bob Hodge and Kam Louie, as far as he also
conceives his study as a political critique. The main difference is, however, that
in his view it is not only Western scholars who are responsible for Sinologist
constructions. Chinese intellectuals are said to be equally involved in it and it is
primarily them to whom he sends his warning:
西方用中国文明作为“他者形象”完成自身的文化认同，中国却从这个“他者形象”中认同自
身，汉学叙事既为中国的现代化展示了某种光辉灿烂的前景，又为中国的现代化运动埋伏
下致命的文化陷阱。西方的文化霸权通过学术话语方式达成。27
(“Using the image of Chinese civilization as the ‘Other’, the West completes its own
cultural identification. But Chinese also identify themselves with this ‘image of the
Other’. On the one hand, the sinological narrative shows some splendid prospects for
China in the modernization process. On the other hand, however, it sets some deadly
cultural traps to China within its modernization movement. The cultural hegemony of the
West is being secured by means of a scholarly discourse.”)
Three points in Zhou Ning’s critique proved seminal for all the subsequent
discussions of Sinologism in China: first, the role of cultural unconsciousness
in the process of identifying oneself with images, theories and norms that
originate from the West; second, the problem of objectivity in sinological stu-
dies, the observation, according to which Sinology only seems to produce
objective (keguan客观) knowledge and that in questions concerning the produc-
tion of knowledge about China every scholar should exercise him/herself in
scholarly introspection (xueke fanxing 学科反省); and third, the conviction that
knowledge and power are inseparably mutually tied and the perceived necessity
for the academy to be aware of its own involvement in politics.
All these points were later elaborated upon in the works of Gu Mingdong,
who is one of the most prominent figures in the debates on Sinologism. It would
be no exaggeration to say that it is largely due to his numerous essays on
Sinologism in Chinese and English languages as well as to his recent monograph
24 Zhou 2004: 5.
25 Zhou 2004: 12.
26 Zhou 2004: 8.
27 Zhou 2004: 12.
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Sinologism, an Alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism (2013)28 that the
topic has enjoyed an extraordinary enduring popularity among Chinese scho-
lars. In spite of an obvious influence which Zhou Ning exerted on Gu Mingdong,
the latter displays a quite different attitude towards the objectivity issue and the
relationship between power and knowledge.
For Gu, sinologism is “a theory of knowledge production about China,
guided by Western-centric ideology, epistemology, methodology, and Western
perspectives, and immensely complicated by the responses of the Chinese and
non-Western people.”29 Epistemological colonization of China in Western and
Chinese Sinology is the leitmotif of his critique. Although he points to the
prominence of the Eurocentric approach to China within the Sinologism dis-
course, he also speaks about Sinologism as characteristic of studies that repre-
sent an explicitly China-centered approach, as Paul A. Cohen’s Discovering
History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past
(New York: Columbia University Press 1984) or John Schrecker’s The Chinese
Revolution in Historical Perspective (New York: Greenwood Press 1991), – works
that try to defy prejudices of Western-oriented historical science and insist on a
self-contained Chinese history. Both works are products of the modern Sinology.
Among earlier studies criticized by Gu for Sinologism are discussions of China
by Leibniz, Wolff, Hegel, Weber, etc.: both idealistic and critical visions of
China, i. e. works, in which China is treated with a perceivable subjectivity.
As the title of his monograph on Sinologism suggests, Gu means by his
critique not only to expose Sinologism as a variant of Orientalism in the sense of
Said, but primarily – and in this point he differs considerably from his prede-
cessors – as an alternative for, or a criticism against Foucault and Said. He
accounts for the necessity of this alternative as follows: “My new vision is: as
both Orientalism and postcolonialism emphasize political criticism, they are
incapable of resolving purely scholarly issues. Most assuredly, they are incap-
able of disinterested scholarship.”30 The act of distancing himself from the
classics of postcolonial studies is the major theme in his various articles, for
example in “Hou zhimin lilun de quehan yu hanxue zhuyi de tidai lilun”后殖民
理论的缺憾与汉学主义的替代理论 (“On the drawbacks of postcolonial studies
28 One of the important sources of inspiration for Gu Mingdong’s critique of Sinologism was a
rather short English monograph by Adrian Chan, which appeared one year earlier: Orientalism
in Sinology (2012.) Adrian Chan does not use the term Sinologism, but the aim of his critique is
exactly the same – to dismiss Western concepts and theories, which have been produced by
Western and Chinese sinologists, from China-related studies.
29 Gu 2013: 6.
30 Gu 2013: 25.
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and on Sinologism as an alternative to them”31), in which it is stressed, that his
critique of Sinologism is called to liberate Sinology of politics as well as of
ideology and to promote the production of objective and bias-free knowledge, or
in “‘Hanxue zhuyi’ lilun yu shijian wenti zai bianxi: zou xiang zijue fansi, jin
keneng keguan gongzheng de zhishi chansheng” ‘汉学主义’理论与实践问题再
辨析—走向自觉反思、尽可能客观公正的知识产生 (“A new critical analysis of
the theory and practice of Sinologism: Towards the production of self-con-
sciously reflected, the most possibly objective and bias-free knowledge”32),
which is introduced with the statement that his critique is to be understood as
a theory of introspection (fansi 反思) and not as a political critique.
Scholarly objectivity, which Gu means to achieve by his rejection of politics
and ideology, concerns primarily studies on China’s cultural identity in the
global context. One could expect that Gu’s works would provide some argumen-
tation in support of the pursued objectivity, or at least that they themselves may
count as illustrating an objective and bias-free attitude. Yet Gu abstains from
any argumentative epistemological justification of objectivity and practices a
highly personal subjective style throughout his critical works, which contrast
drastically with the objectivity issue. For example, in his above mentioned
article “‘Hanxue zhuyi’ lilun”, he presents a scathing criticism of Foucault’s
theory of knowledge and power, which is based only on Gu’s conviction,
according to which Foucault’s thoughts are purely destructive and not able to
answer questions concerning knowledge production.33 It is also striking that, in
order to support this conviction, he quotes the following lyrical passage from Ye
Jun, a fellow-critic of Sinologism:
“权力”作为一个学术概念，发展到福柯，已经是“夕阳无限好，只是近黄昏”，因为它虽然
作为概念工具很好用，但其实有很大的问题。因为它绝对不能抹杀人类对美好人性、社会
和谐、情感的向往和追求。34
(“As soon as the concept of power becomes part of Foucault’s theory, it is already a
‘beautiful sunset, which spreads everywhere, but is about to disappear in the dusk.’
Although it may be useful as a conceptual tool, in reality it is very problematic. This
concept is not able to put an end to man’s striving for good human nature, for social
harmony and sentiments.”)
The allusion to Li Shangyin’s 李商隐 poem Ascending to the Leyou park (Deng
Leyouyuan 登乐游原) is called to pictorially suggest the impracticality of
31 Gu 2015a.
32 Gu 2015b.
33 Gu 2015b: 12.
34 Ye 2014: 6, quoted by Gu 2015b: 12.
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Foucault’s theory, to refute it by means of rhetoric, not by arguments. It is one of
numerous instances, in which Gu Mingdong exercises rhetoric while he dis-
cusses the issue of objectivity and scholarly disinterestedness. Among further
distinctive rhetorical means, to which he constantly resorts, are images from the
semantic field of purification and healing. Here are some examples from the
Sinologism-monograph: China’s intellectuals are practicing an “unhealthy
fetishization of Western theories” (p. 1), Gu’s work is meant to contribute to “a
healthy development of globalization” (p. 10), Sinologim displays “symptoms of
the epistemological and methodological malady” (pp. 18–19) and suffers from
“intellectual sickness” (p. 109), it is “an intellectual impediment to healthy
globalization” (p. 96), etc. The complementary character of objectivity and
health, which makes an argumentative treatment of the issue redundant, is
expressed as follows: “It [Sinologism] has hindered objective understanding
and representation of China and Chinese culture and will continue to be an
obstacle to cultural exchange and the healthy development of globalization.”35
Intensive use of the healing and purification rhetoric may be regarded as
characteristic of all great epochs of transition, which strive for a comprehensive
epistemic restructuring. This was also true for the May Fourth movement and it
seems to be no coincidence, that Gu – like the theorists of Occidentalism –
dedicates a large portion of his critique to the May Fourth. He makes this
movement responsible for a fetishization of Western norms and values, which
eventually resulted in a firm establishment of Sinologism in Chinese modernity
and in a rapid dissemination of the harmful idea of Western cultural
superiority.36
Gu’s critique of Sinologism reveals a number of contradictions. His admoni-
tion to reject politics is accompanied by the demand to study Chinese materials
only in terms of Chinese culture and to distance oneself from Western theories,37
which is an out-and-out political statement. The main critical argument against
Said is that China has never been colonized by the West.38 And yet he himself
makes regular use of the image of a mental colonization of China,39 which lets
35 Gu 2013: 18.
36 For Gu’s criticism of the May Fourth, see Gut 2013: 85–94. For the role of the healing and
purification rhetoric in the production of new epistemic structures in Republican China, see
Vetrov 2012.
37 Gu 2014: 712.
38 Gu 2013: 3: “the postcolonial discourse has its own limits... One obvious point is that China
was never colonized by the West.”
39 Sinologism as a “non-territorial colonization” (Gu 2013: 11), Sinologism as a “non-violent
colonization” (Gu 2013: 59), “the Chinese self-colonization” as “a form of epistemological
colonization” (Gu 2013: 111), etc.
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him appear as supportive of the Orientalism critique in Chinese context. Gu is
occasionally aware of his contradictions and at some instances he calls himself a
utopian,40 which, however, does not hinder him to hold fast to his alternative
and continue to ignore the obvious political implications pertaining to his
apolitical gesture.
4 Part III Xinzixue: Fetching the stones from the
other mountain
Chinese critics of Orientalism and Sinologism tend to a blanket rejection of
Western scholarly methodology in China related studies. It is common for all
of them, that Western methods provide them with a theoretical starting point,
turn out to be crucial for the construction of their own scholarly identities, and
yet at the same time – paradoxically – are felt as something negative. In such
cases, critiques of Said and Foucault may be interpreted at least in part as a
negation of one’s own academic identity, which reflects a wanting self-aware-
ness. But not all debates of Chinese intellectuals concerning their cultural
identity in the post-modern global context lose their way in a similar methodo-
logical dead end. Within the current Chinese academic landscape, a special
attention deserves a large movement, which during the last four years has
found supporters all over China, and even far beyond China – the xinzixue, or:
China’s new school of thought-masters.41 Without being directly involved in the
debates on Orientalism and Sinologism, the xinzixue-proponents raise all the
40 Gu 2013: 9: “This last aim [getting free from political interference of any kind] may seem
rather utopian...” Or: “For this purpose we need to desensitize awareness of a scholar’s ethnicity
and intensify the necessity of scholarly objectivity in producing and evaluating knowledge
about China and the West, even though it is impossible to totally separate scholarship from
politics.” (Gu 2013: 186). For criticism of Gu Mingdong’s objectivity issue and the rejection of
politics in studies on national identity, see the essays by Zhao Xifang赵稀方 (Zhao 2014, 2015).
In general terms, Zhao characterizes Gu’s views as utopian. However, in “Against dual con-
frontations”, he arrives at the following compromise solution of the problem: “Non-political
knowledge, which is advocated by Gu, is not really possible, but we should accept it as an ideal
in the process of our mutual rapprochement within the dialogue of cultures.” (Zhao 2015: 34).
41 For a good review of numerous academic talks and publications on the xinzixue, see Diao/
Wang 2013 and Liu 2015. In Diao/Wang 2013: 3, Cao Chuji‘s 曹础基 presentation “ “Xinzixue”
xuanxiang” “新子学” 悬想 (“Some Speculations on the Xinzixue”) is being discussed. Cao
speculates upon the possibility of a two-fold syntactic division of the expression xinzixue:
“xin zhi zixue” 新之子学, A New School of Thought Masters, i. e. old masters seen in a new
perspective, or: xinzi zhi xue 新子之学, i. e. a School of New Masters of Thought, in which
744 Viatcheslav Vetrov
issues discussed above and find solutions which seem to be much less
contradictory.
The name xinzixue refers to the revival of ancient Chinese schools of thought
and scholars (Laozi, Kongzi, Zhuangzi, Guanzi, Huainanzi etc.), who, due to the
current global challenges for China, – since the beginning of the reform course
in the eighties, since the beginning of the economic boom and the contrasting
rather slow development of the cultural self-consciousness – are made subject of
new interpretations and take a key position in the debates concerning China’s
cultural identity. Whereas the period between the eighties and 2012 – the year,
when the first manifesto for xinxixue, Fang Yong’s 方勇 article “Xinzixue goux-
iang42” “新子学“构想 (“Considerations concerning the ‘New School of Thought-
Masters’”) was published, – was marked by the so-called ruxue-fever43 and by
the predominance of (Neo)Confucianism in various programs of identity con-
structions, the proponents of the xinzixue put forward the idea of plurality and
competition among thought-masters (baijia zhengming 百家争鸣).
In his manifesto, Fang Yong comments on the necessity of the revival of the
ancient thought masters as follows: Since ancient times, the transmission of
knowledge in China followed two courses, i. e. that of an official courtly scholar-
ship (wangguan zhi xue 王官之学), which stood completely in the service of
politics and identified itself with six canonical scriptures (liu jing六经), and that
of non-canonical competing masters of thought (zhuzi zhi xue诸子之学), which,
though being in direct contact with the official scholarship, differed from it in a
considerable manner, as it displayed much more mobility and creativeness. The
zi of the xinzixue is to be understood as a part of zhuzi zhi xue, and not as the
adoption of the zi category pertaining to the traditional classification of knowl-
edge into jing 经 (canons), shi 史 (history), zi 子 (masters), ji 集 (miscellanea), in
which the zi category was not necessarily associated with original creative
thought, but also subsumed masters of fortune telling, yin/yang calculations
and astrology (fangji方技.) The xinzixue program is an attempt of a new system-
atization of knowledge: the new school of thought-masters has to single out
outstanding creative thought-masters of antiquity and to elaborate new ways of
text-critical approach to them. The word new accentuates the important connec-
tions between this agenda, the current cultural identity problem, and the glo-
balization consciousness (quanqiuhua yishi全球化意识.) The role of the xinzixue
contemporary intellectuals are regarded as zi (masters), who are conscious of continuities
between their own work and the legacy of ancient Chinese thinkers.
42 Fang 2012: 14.
43 For the ruxue-fever, see foot-note 2 above.
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studies in the process of current Chinese identity building is explained in terms
of cultural peculiarities pertaining to Chinese thought-masters of antiquity:
子学根植于中国文化土壤，其学术理念、思维方式等皆与民族文化精神、语文生态密切关
系。对相关学术概念、范畴和体系的建构，本应从中国学术自身的发展实践中总结、概
括、提炼而来。“新子学”即是此理念的实践。如在思维方式上，诸子百家重智慧，讲彻
悟，不拘泥于具象，不执著与分析。表述形式上，或对话，或随笔，或注疏，不拘一格，
各唱风流。这些都是存在于特定历史阶段的思维方式和话语风格，本不与西方乃至中国当
前的思维话语相类。44
(The roots of the school of (Chinese) masters of thought lie in the soil of Chinese culture. Their
scholarly principles, mentality etc. are closely connected with the spirit of national culture as
well as with the ecology of language and literature. Any setups of corresponding concepts,
categories and systems have to be derived from the real development of Chinese scholarship
itself, have to sum it up, to be the pure fruit of it. The New School of Thought-Masters is the
implementation of these principles into practice. As for the mentality, Hundred Schools of
Thought appreciated wisdom and discussed the issue of complete understanding, without
pursuing blindly a concretization or sticking to analytical precision. As for the form of
exposition, they could make use of a dialogue, of an informal essay, of a commentary, in
which they expressed themselves completely freely, without any restraints. All this existed
thanks to a specific historically conditioned mentality and discourse, and was not at all of the
same kind as the Western discourse, not even as that of contemporary China.)
By taking the issue with the clarity of exposition, analytical precision and formal
constraint, Fang Yong addresses a topic, which has been heatedly discussed in
China and in the West over the last hundred years, i. e. the applicability of the
concept of philosophy to the heritage of Chinese thought. He discusses this issue
at large in his other essays, as well, for example in “Xinzixue” “shen lun” “新子
学” 申论 (“A detailed discussion of the xinzixue”), where it is stated that history
of philosophy (zhexueshi 哲学史) is not an indigenous Chinese subject, but a
Western transplant (yi men yizhi de xueke 一门移植的学科45), a cast of Chinese
materials into Western forms. In his view, the Chinese masters of thought were
never preoccupied with meeting the criteria of pure scholarship or pure thinking
(chuncui de xueshu yu sixiang de biaozhun纯粹的学术与思想的标准46), therefore
they were not identical with Western philosophy (zhexue 哲学.) He calls his
readers to follow the original discourse and to apply traditional methods of
44 Fang Yong 方勇, “Xin zi xue” “gouxiang”, in: Guangming ribao 光明日报 22th Oct. 2012,
p. 14.
45 Fang 2013a: 74. On the relationship between Chinese Masters Texts and the discipline of
philosophy as well as on the broader issue of the inter-cultural translation of disciplines, see
also Denecke 2010.
46 Fang Yong 2013a: 73.
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scholarly approach, such as studies of rhymes and character variants, drawing
on history, political and economic sciences, only then is it possible to know the
true face (zhenshi mianmao 真实面貌47) of the indigenous Chinese scholarship.
One might gain the impression, that the search for what is true, original and
unique in the tradition would be accompanied by a rejection of Western methods,
as it was the case with the Chinese critiques of Orientalism and Sinologism. But
this is exactly not so, as Fang Yong and other pioneers of the xinzixue constantly
emphasise. Already in his manifesto of 2012, Fang Yong stated that it would be
false “to explain China only in Chinese terms” (yi Zhongguo jieshi Zhongguo以中
国解释中国.) According to Fang, one should not forget to adopt what constitutes
the strength of Western scholarship, i. e. one should “fetch the stones from the
other mountain.” The stones from the other mountain (ta shan zhi shi 他[它]山之
石) are a metaphor for a dialectical development of one’s identity building: the
West appears not simply as a challenge or as a threat, on the contrary it is the
familiarity with the West – with the ‘Other’, that is as unique as the Chinese
‘self’ – which counts as a prerequisite for a successful cognition of one’s own
cultural self. The dialectical perspective of perceiving what is one’s own in a
pluralistic world has to be constantly thought of as analogous of the competition
among ancient Chinese thought-masters. This is the key argument in Fang Yong’s
“Zai lun “Xinzixue” “再论“新子学”48 (“Talking again about the xinzixue”.) The
vital force (shengmingli 生命力) of the thought-masters manifested itself in their
accentuated autonomy of character (renge duli 人格独立), spiritual freedom
(jingshen ziyou 精神自由), in the equality of all schools of thought involved in
a mutual polemic (xuepai zhi jian pingdeng duihua, xianghu zhengming 学派之间
平等对话、相互争鸣.) Fang Yong backs these observations up, quoting from the
bibliographical chapter (“Yiwenzhi” 藝文志) of the Hanshu 漢書 (History of the
Han): “其言虽殊，辟犹水火，相灭亦相生也。49 (“Although their [zi, thought-
masters̒ – V. V.] words were as different as fire differs from water, by mutual
annihilation they also contributed to each other’s affirmation.”)
Xuan Hua玄华, who is another xinzixue-proponent, dedicated to this dialectics
of the mutual identity construction his essay “Guan yu ‘Xin zi xue’ ji ge jiben wenti
de zai sikao” 关于 “新子学”几个基本问题的再思考 (“New thoughts upon some
fundamental questions concerning the xinzixue”.) He also approaches this issue by
a projection of the plurality characteristic of the current process of identity building
into the antiquity: In a pluralistic world, one is always confronted with others (tazhe
47 Fang Yong, 2013a: 74.
48 Fang 2013b: 15.
49 “Yiwenzhi” 藝文志 (Hanshu, 1962: 1746).
Xinzixue: An Alternative to Sinologism? 747
他者), and one’s own development goes parallel with a continuous self-alienation
(bu duan di ziwo fouding de fazhan不断地自我否定地发展50). The concept of self-
alienation is meant as a necessary component of self-assertion, a thought that was
similarly evoked in Fang Yong’s above quotation from the Hanshu. Both emphasise
that the perception of differences is crucial for one’s identity building. Xuan Hua’s
pleading for differences is as follows:
“诸子学现象”有一个较为突出的特点是，其内部组成部分之间存在极大差异，相互诘难，
乃至否定，但在客观形式上却促成了各自独特性的确立。在学术文化上，任何诸子个体必
须在面对他者，尤其是在面对多元的诸子现象本身时，才确立自身。如孔子正是面对老
子、子产、墨子、韩非子等时才确立为孔子。51
(The phenomenon of the ancient thought-masters is marked by a specific peculiar feature,
namely by massive differences pertaining to its constitutive parts, i.e. mutual confronta-
tions and negations, which, if seen objectively, accelerated the affirmation of every
competing individuality. Within this scholarly culture, an individuality of thought could
affirm itself only when it was confronted with another or with the whole plurality of other
thinkers. For example, the affirmation of Confucius resulted from confronting him with
Laozi, Zichan, Mozi, Hanfeizi, etc.)
The implicit self-negation characteristic of the critics of Orientalism and
Sinologism, who plead for a blanket rejection of Western methodology, appears
to be much less problematic and contradictory here, as it is made an explicit
subject of a direct theoretical investigation and as the negation, or self-
alienation, turns into its opposite. The same seems to be true with the objectivity
issue: in contrast to Gu Mingdong, who exercises rhetorical means while exert-
ing himself for scholarly objectivity, the proponents of the xinzixue attempt to
grasp the same issue conceptually, to provide a systematic argumentation in
support of objectivity as a unity of negation and affirmation in the process of
identity building. Only then, as a second step, do they resort to rhetoric, and it is
not a coincidence that they, again similar to Gu Mingdong, who advocates a
healthy global Sinology discourse, identify their own program as a medicine:
Fang Yong speaks of a necessity to care for a “healthy development of Chinese
national culture” (tuidong Zhonghua minzu wenhua de jiankang fazhan推动中华
民族文化的健康发展52) in the face of globalization, and Xuan Hua concludes his
study with the observation, according to which the xinzixue is going to become a
useful recipe (liang fang 良方), by which China can finally overcome her “sys-
tematic complexes” (jiaocuo zonghe zheng 交错综合症.53) One of the main
50 Xuan 2013: 105.
51 Xuan 2013: 105.
52 Fang 2013b.
53 Xuan 2013: 109.
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reasons for the use of rhetoric of health, as in the case with the critics of
Orientalism and Sinologism, is the understanding of one’s own program as an
epistemological restructuring. That’s why a critical discussion of the May Fourth
is also one of the main points in the xinzixue-agenda.
The critical attitude to unreflected borrowing of Western terms and concepts
characteristic of the May Fourth was already brought into focus in Fang Yong’s
manifesto of 2012. Among other concepts, from which he tried to distance
himself from the outset, were the above mentioned philosophy and history of
philosophy. In his opinion, the alternative neutral term for the Chinese equiva-
lent of philosophy would be Zhongguo xueshu 中国学术 (Chinese scholarship.54)
Liang Qichao, Hu Shi were among others responsible for propagating Western
terms and methods, which eventually led to a loss of theoretical self-awareness
of the tradition of Chinese thought-masters and to a degradation of this tradition
to the status of a mere “vassal of the history of philosophy” (zhexueshi de
“fuyong” 哲学史的 “附庸”.55)
The May Fourth is consequently considered as a time of not reflected self-
alienation, which did not leave any possibility for turning into its dialectical
opposite. That is why the xinzixue-theorists regard themselves as overcoming the
May Fourth, they confront it rather than state simple continuities between two
discourses as Chen Xiaomei did in her monograph on Occidentalism. For example,
Zhang Hongxing speaks metaphorically about “more than one hundred years of
catastrophes” (yi bai yu nian de zainan一百余年的灾难56), in the course of which
Chinese culture has been exposed to ruinous criticisms, and Tang Tanping, who is
also an active proponent of the xinzixue, bemoans “the one hundred year
long struggle between China and the West, between tradition and modernity”
(zai bai nian lai de Zhong Xi gu jin de zheng在百年来的中西古今的争.57) The May
Fourth is considered to have contributed to these catastrophes in a decisive way,
primarily by promoting a blind identification of one’s cultural self with Western
concepts, as well as by an orientation towards Western norms and ideas with the
only aim of strengthening the nation. That no affirmative identity construction
could be achieved was due to a wanting self-awareness, and first of all to a
wanting awareness of one’s otherness in an intercultural comparison.
The dialectical turn of the xinzixue-advocates opposes any blind adoption of
foreign identities, but at the same time it promotes the idea, according to which
good knowledge of foreign identities is of great importance for one’s own
54 Fang 2013a: 73.
55 Fang 2013a: 73.
56 Zhang 2013: 80.
57 Tang 2012: 96.
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successful identity building. For this reason, even the concepts, from which they
distance themselves most critically, such as philosophy and history of philosophy,
may be regarded as stones from the other mountain: formal constraints, analy-
tical precision, pure thinking, etc. – possessing theoretical knowledge of all
these features as being constitutive for the identity of the other, as an ideal type,
in contrast to what one experiences in one’s own tradition, supports a better
understanding of one’s own cultural self. This is why the attitude of the xinzixue-
proponents to the May Fourth is also marked by dialectics: despite an open
confrontation with it, they put themselves simultaneously in a kind of genealo-
gical relationship to it; for this reason, Xuan Hua speaks about the May Fourth
as a station between antiquity and the current time of the xinzixue,58 and Tang
Tanping, in his contribution on the necessity of a new restructuring of cultural
knowledge, draws a similar genealogical line and makes use of the Renaissance
(fuxing 复兴) topos, – one of the most characteristic topoi of the May Fourth.
This also is a stone from the other mountain,59 which brings into focus the high
degree of complexity pertaining to the perceived genealogy: the revival of the
thought-masters of Chinese antiquity takes place not only by means of drawing
boundaries between China and the West, or between today and the May Fourth,
but in a significant way also one between today and the antiquity itself, regard-
ing the current stage as a historical individual. This is one of the subtlest ideas
in the article by Xuan Hua that the xinzixue is different from the ancient school of
Chinese thought-masters due to the consciousness of one’s cultural otherness in
the global context, which the antiquity did not possess.60 For this reason, the
current Renaissance should be understood as a transformation and a necessary
restructuring of the tradition of antiquity rather than a mere copy of it:
诸子学的真正觉醒，应该是酝酿于《诸子学刊》的创刊、《子藏》的推出和中国诸子学会
的创立，其真正确立则是到 “新子学” 命题的提出。所谓诸子学自觉，是指将诸子学作为
整体现象研究，同时将其从经学思维与体系的禁锢中解放出来，真正呈现其自身。61
(The real awakening of the new school of Chinese thought-masters began with the
foundation of the Zhuzi xuekan periodical (“A survey of thought-masters”, 2008), with
the organization of a special research project on the textual corpus of thought-masters,
58 Xuan 2013: 105.
59 During the May Fourth, the concept of revival (fuxing) was always associated with European
Renaissance; the revival of one’s own antiquity counted as a program of resuming a cultural
experience of the West, to which the West owed its current strength. For the Renaissance
concept and the Renaissance discourse during the May Fourth, see Grieder 1970 as well as
Vetrov 2012.
60 Xuan 2013: 106.
61 Xuan 2013: 106.
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with the foundation of a special Chinese research association for the studies of thought-
masters of antiquity (2012), but the real appearance of this school took place with the
formulation of the xinzixue-thesis [i. e., in Fang Yong’s manifesto from 2012 – V. V.] The
awakened self-consciousness of the school of thought-masters refers to a comprehensive
academic research on them, which goes along with freeing them from the canonical
thought and from the yoke of systematics.)
The perception of the current epoch as a historical individual, i. e. as a discourse,
which differs from any other discourse of the past, is shared by all proponents of
the xinzixue. Common for them all is also the awareness of the political compo-
nent pertaining to discussions on national identity. The academia does not
appear as something politically neutral or independent of political issues, nor
as participating in a conspiracy between knowledge and power, but as a subject
of an open discussion on political issues. Fang Yong, who was among the
initiators of all the xinzixue-projects listed in the above passage by Xuan Hua,
states his attitude to politics quite unequivocally in his manifesto of 2012:
在国势昌盛，经济繁荣的今天，全面复兴子学的时机已经成熟，“新子学” 正以饱满的姿态
蓄势待发。62
(Today, in an epoch of a fully unfolded national power and booming economy, the time
has come for a comprehensive renaissance of the learning of the thought-masters; the New
School of Thought-Masters collects its strength and is waiting energetically for its decisive
move.)
Here, too, the idea of a renaissance – a stone from the other mountain – appears
as a resumption of a national cultural program from the epoch of the May
Fourth, when culture was made a subject of heated polemics among Chinese
intellectuals. The perception of one’s own academic activity as part of a political
issue of general national concern is also reflected in references which the
xinzixue-proponents make to correspondences between their program and the
decision of the Communist Party of the 18th October 201163: this decision stated a
necessity “of the principle of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred
62 Fang 2012.
63 Zhang 2013: 81; Tang 2012: 95. The Decision was published in the Renmin ribao on 26th Oct.
2011 (p. 1, p. 5) under the title “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige
tuidong shehui zhiyi wenhua da fazhan da fanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding, 2011 nian
10 yue 18 ri Zhongguo gongchandang di shi qi jie Zhong yang weiyuanhui di liu ci quan ti huiyi
tongguo” 中共中央关于深化文化体制改革推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣若干重大问题的决
定，2011年10月18日中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第六次全体会议通过 (“Decision of the
CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of the cultural system
and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture, Decision passed at
the Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee on October 18th 2011.”)
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schools of thought contend”,64 of “drawing upon and assimilating outstanding
cultural achievements of other countries”,65 which is motivated by the percep-
tion of the Chinese cultural development as being “not entirely in accord with
our economic and social development”,66 a need to “increase people’s sense of
identity with the great motherland and the Chinese nation”67(zengjin dui weida
zuguo he Zhonghua minzu de rentong 增进对伟大祖国和中华民族的认同), to
“foster academic and artistic democracy”68 (jianchi fayang xueshu minzhu,
yishu minzhu坚持发扬学术民主、艺术民主), to “carry forward the revolutionary
cultural tradition established since the May 4th Movement”,69 to “learn... of
foreign countries”70 and to “develop a philosophy (sic) and the social sciences
with Chinese features”71 (jianshe juyou Zhongguo tese, Zhongguo fengge,
Zhongguo qipai de zhexue shehui kexue 建设具有中国特色、中国风格、中国气
派的哲学社会科学.)
Although the xinzixue-program displays considerable correspondences with
the party decision, it is by far more complex than a mere fulfillment of a task
which is sanctioned from above: their vision of the May Fourth, of the dialectics
of self-alienation and affirmation pertaining to identity building, their handling
of concepts – among other things that of philosophy – testify to a large degree of
autonomy and creativity with which they address the issue of cultural revival
64 The English translation of the CPC Central Committee Decision text is taken from its official
online English version (http://www.cctb.net/bygz/wxfy/201111/t20111117_285296.htm), here p. 5.
65 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of
the cultural system and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture”
(2011): 5.
66 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of
the cultural system and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture”
(2011): 6.
67 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of
the cultural system and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture”
(2011): 10.
68 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of
the cultural system and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture”
(2011): 12.
69 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of
the cultural system and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture”
(2011): 12.
70 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of
the cultural system and promoting the great development and flourishing of socialist culture”
(2011): 12.
71 “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues pertaining to deepening reform of
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and present the construction of national identity as a pluralistic process. Thanks
to this plurality, to the adoption of the dialectical method and to the under-
standing of cultural development as a political issue, the advocates of the
xinzixue do not only overcome a desperate confrontation with the West, which
is characteristic of many critics of Orientalism and Sinologism, but also offer
some useful stones for the other mountain. Among other things, they demon-
strate that ties connecting power and knowledge are not necessarily harmful for
an intercultural dialogue, as long as they are made subject of conscious atten-
tion and as long as nothing hampers the perception of peculiarities pertaining to
all participants in the dialogue.
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